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TRAINED MANPOWER: USA versus USSR

THE EDITORS

AN ASIAN VIEW OF ISRAEL AND EGYPT

K. B. THAKORE

VOL. 8

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*The Decline of Feudalism and the
Rise of the Bourgeoisie* FRIEDRICH ENGELS

EDITORS . . . LEO HUBERMAN . PAUL M. SWEETZ

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NOTES FROM THE EDITORS

The Political Economy of Growth, by Paul A. Baran, Professor of Economics at Stanford University, will be officially published on April 18th, and we are happy to be able to announce that Professor Baran will be in New York for the occasion and will speak at an MR Associates meeting that evening on the subject of "Marxist Thought Today." For details regarding the book and the meeting, please turn to the back cover.

The news about Solomon Adler's *The Chinese Economy* is not quite so cheerful. Owing to various matters of editorial detail which have had to be ironed out by lengthy trans-Atlantic correspondence, our original hope to make a late spring publication date will not be fulfilled. By the time this issue is out, the book will be in galley proof, but the completed volume will not be ready until summer. Advance orders will be filled at that time, but official publication date will be postponed until after the vacation months.

As of the time of writing, Leo Huberman is on his way from India to Japan where he will remain about a month before returning to the United States. He will definitely speak at the Unitarian Church in Los Angeles on

(continued on inside back cover)

TRAINED MANPOWER: USA VERSUS USSR

This is going to be a sort of book review. To be sure, our lead article is not normally devoted to book reviews, but then this is the kind of book that doesn't normally get reviewed. It is entitled *Instrumentation and Automation*, and it constitutes the record of hearings held during December, 1956, before a Congressional committee. This 202-page document contains material bearing on a variety of subjects, including the contrasting ways in which the United States and the Soviet Union are meeting the educational problems posed by an age of extremely complex technology. The reason we want to direct your attention to these questions with particular emphasis is simple: we believe that it is in this area that the superiority of socialism over capitalism is most clearly visible. More than that, it is very likely the area in which the historical competition between the systems will be finally settled.

But before we get into these problems, it may be useful to outline the Congressional and bibliographical background of the December hearings.

After World War II, Congress passed the Employment Act of 1946, designed to give legislative expression to the New Deal philosophy that government has a responsibility for the overall functioning of the economy. Under the Act, two agencies were created, one Administrative and one Congressional. The former was the Council of Economic Advisers, which, as its name implies, was charged with studying the economy on a continuing basis and advising the President regarding policies designed to stabilize activity at a high level. The main tangible product of the Committee is an annual report on the state of the economy, released shortly after Congress convenes in January. The Congressional agency created by the Employment Act was a joint Senate and House committee charged with overseeing the implementation of the Act, and in particular given the task of considering and reporting to Congress on the annual Economic Report. The Committee, originally taking its name from the latter function, was called the Joint Committee on the Economic Report. But as time went on, its interests and the scope of its studies broadened and during 1956 its name was changed to the Joint Economic Committee.

The Joint Economic Committee, like other Congressional com-

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mittees, operates through subcommittees, and one of these is the Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization which has been headed since 1954 by Representative Wright Patman of Texas, co-author of the famous Robinson-Patman Act and long known as a Congressional champion of small businessmen and low interest rates.

During October, 1955, the Patman Subcommittee held a series of hearings on automation and subsequently issued a brief report.* These hearings have since become a standard source for all students of automation and the new technologies generally. In the Report, the Subcommittee announced that it would continue to concern itself with this field in the future. In keeping with this intention, further hearings were held this past December, and the indications are that from now on they will be an annual feature of the Subcommittee's work. In what follows we shall refer to the December hearings as the Instrumentation Hearings.**

Insofar as there can be said to have been a unifying theme to these latest hearings, it is that the United States is faced with an immediate, urgent, and growing shortage of scientific, engineering, and trained technical personnel. This was testified to by businessmen, educators, and government officials alike: there was no dissenting voice. And there was almost equal unanimity that the gravity of the situation for this country is vastly intensified by the sensational achievements of the Soviet Union in precisely this area of highly qualified manpower.

The statistical data presented by the various witnesses are not always entirely consistent, and in some cases there is some doubt about just what interpretation should be put upon them.† But the overall picture emerges clearly enough:

* The full references are (1) *Automation and Technological Change*, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization of the Joint Committee on the Economic Report, 84th Congress, 1st Session, Oct. 14, 15, 17, 18, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 1955 (Washington, 1955); and (2) *Automation and Technological Change*, Report of the Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization to the Joint Committee on the Economic Report, 84th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, 1955). These are the documents on which the article "Militarism and American Technological and Scientific Progress" in last month's MR was based.

** The full reference is *Instrumentation and Automation*, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization of the Joint Economic Committee, 84th Congress, 2nd Session, December 12, 13, 14, 1956 (Washington, 1956).

† In this connection, it should be noted in passing that Representative Patman, while seriously interested in the subjects under inquiry, has no particular expertise, and that his professional staff is evidently very weak. The result, of course, is that the information elicited at the hearings is much less complete and valuable than it would be if they were prepared and conducted by skilled investigators.

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(1) Already by 1954 the pool of scientists and engineers in the Soviet Union was slightly larger than in this country (p. 7). Since then, the rate of increase has been higher in the USSR by a rapidly increasing margin. Here are figures for thousands of engineers graduated (pp. 7, 104, 112):

	<i>United States</i>	<i>Soviet Union</i>
1954	22	53
1955	23	63
1956	26	71

(2) The situation with regard to technicians is more blurred. In the 1955 Hearings before the Patman Subcommittee, data were introduced purporting to show that the annual rate of technician training in the United States was approximately 50 thousand and in the USSR 1.6 million, and this was accepted by the Subcommittee, which stated in its Report that "technicians [in the USSR] are currently being turned out at 30 or 40 times our rate." (*Report*, p. 8.) This is, on the face of it, a highly suspicious statistic, and it may be worthwhile therefore to quote from the testimony of a witness at the 1956 Hearings who made a special point of trying to get at the true facts of technician training. The witness is Mr. Albert F. Sperry, President of Panellit, Inc., an Illinois data-processing and systems-engineering firm. After explaining that he had found it difficult to believe that the Russians were doing 32 times as well as the United States and had therefore sought information from the Army as to their technician-training program, Mr. Sperry engaged in the following colloquy with Representative Patman (p. 140):

Mr. Sperry. . . . My estimate of the total number of technicians trained each year, not including those given on-job training by industry, would be as follows: 150,000 men trained by the armed services, plus 50,000 men trained by our vocational schools, and approximately another 50,000 being trained by the government for civilian duties. This last group I estimated on the basis of Army Progress Report 4-B on Civilian Personnel. This adds up to a grand total of approximately one-quarter million technicians per year that we are training in this country exclusive of those being trained by private industry.

I think if you take that figure of a quarter million we can still say that Russia is 2 or 3 times as well off as we are in that respect.

Chairman Patman. But if you reduce their number by eliminating the mechanics, it is possible we would be closer together.

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Mr. Sperry. We are closer together but they are still ahead—it seems to me that it is a sufficiently startling figure that they are twice as far ahead. To me that is the estimate that I would make after talking with these men [in the armed services].

Chairman Patman. That is very shocking itself, that is shocking.

Mr. Sperry. I think that is more than shocking. I think it is dangerous. When I hear a figure such as 32 times as many, I begin to discount it so much that I wanted to get the real meat out of this. I want to point out that you can discount it all you want and it is still a shocking figure.

(3) The shortage of engineers and technicians in this country is hardly less striking when measured against current and prospective needs than when measured against the achievements of the USSR. According to Dr. Eric A. Walker, President of Pennsylvania State University: "In 1954, 40,000 engineers were needed; our colleges and universities provided only 22,000. The shortage, of course, is accumulative; in 1955, about 80,000 were needed, and we graduated less than 23,000." (P. 118.) Taking account of the fact that the spread of the new technologies is expanding the need for technical personnel very rapidly, we can see that, given a continuation of the present slow rise in the number of engineering graduates, the deficit will soon grow to astronomical proportions.

Matters are, if anything, even worse with regard to the supply of technicians. According to several expert witnesses, an engineer working under optimum conditions should have the assistance of three to five technicians, while the actual ratio in this country today is about one to one (p. 105). Since there are more than 700,000 scientists and engineers (p. 7), this would indicate a minimum deficit of at least 2 million technicians. Actually, the deficit is certainly much greater since the new technologies have an insatiable appetite for highly skilled repair and maintenance men as well as for operators of many types of complicated equipment, most of whose work is quite independent of that of engineers.

All this, to be sure, leaves much to be desired from the point of view of conceptual tidiness and statistical precision, but it also leaves little doubt about the main point: from the scientific and technological point of view, the United States educational system is (1) falling farther and farther behind that of its chief rival for world pre-eminence, and (2) failing by a widening margin to satisfy the country's own needs for trained manpower.

But perhaps this state of affairs is merely temporary? Perhaps the pace of advance will soon slacken in the USSR? Or perhaps we are taking steps to reduce the gap and eventually catch up with the

Soviet Union and meet our own needs?

The answer to all these questions is an emphatic negative, and there is ample evidence from the Instrumentation Hearings to prove it.

The heart of the matter is teachers. The Soviet system puts teachers at the top of the professions, we put them at the bottom. The result, of course, is that their ablest young people flock into teaching, ours flock out. The juxtaposition of two quotes will serve to drive this contrast home in the clearest possible way. Number (1) is from a paper reprinted in the Hearings entitled "Little Ivan Goes to School." It is by Dr. C. J. Lapp, Deputy Director of the Office of Scientific Personnel, National Research Council, and was delivered at a meeting of educators in Washington on November 13, 1956. Number (2) is from the statement of Dr. Eric Walker, President of Penn State, which we have already had occasion to cite above:

(1) Their [the Soviets'] educational purpose is indicated by the intense teacher training program, and the high percent of their graduates of higher education turned back into teaching. *At the present time it is reported to be 50 percent.* The salary levels of teachers indicate that the Soviets are playing for keeps. President Homer Dodge reports that the salary of an experienced upper grade teacher is about the same as an experienced doctor and three fourths as much as a factory foreman. The salary of a professor is four times that of a skilled mechanic. (Pp. 113-114. Emphasis added.)

(2) The shortage of engineers and scientists is felt throughout our social structure and not just in the industrial world. Undoubtedly, it accounts in part for our severe shortage of teachers; some experts estimate that our supply of teachers is dropping behind demand at the fearful rate of 60,000 a year, and that the deficit may reach 520,000 by 1966. *Industry, by outbidding our schools for the best talent, is draining off a large percentage of our superior teachers and, by doing so, may be guaranteeing that the shortage will last for many years to come.* The number of teachers qualified to teach physics, for example, has decreased by 74 percent in the last several years, and the well qualified high-school science teacher has all but disappeared. (P. 118. Emphasis added.)

The implication of these statements is clear and unavoidable: the Soviet Union is already harvesting something like twice the technologically trained manpower crop that we are and plowing half of it back for the future. So far, we have managed to keep up, perhaps even to keep ahead, in terms of numbers actually employed in industry—but only by using up the seed from which future crops must be grown. Barring a reversal of these trends, the already striking

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disparity in the growth rates there and here will increase, not diminish, with every year that passes. And sooner or later, a great flood of scientists, engineers, and technicians is certain to spill out of the Soviet educational system and to become available for industrial employment—no doubt outside the Soviet Union as well as within its borders.

The chances of a reversal are not great. The vast Soviet educational system has been gathering momentum for more than three decades, and it seems obvious that nothing short of an atomic world war could halt it now. The only question is whether the United States can still hope to catch up.

At first glance, it might appear that the prospect is literally hopeless, and indeed this is the conclusion which at least one expert seems already to have drawn. True, none of the witnesses at the Instrumentation Hearings went so far, but one of our top nuclear physicists has since gone on record to that effect in no uncertain terms. Speaking at a conference in Washington on February 15th, Edward Teller, Professor of Physics at the University of California and reputed father of the H-bomb, predicted flatly that in ten years world leadership in science would pass to the Soviet Union. We quote from the account which appeared in the *New York Times* the next day:

Ten years ago, Dr. Teller observed, "there was no question where the best scientists in the world could be found—here in the United States."

"Today," he continued, "our leadership in science is being challenged by Russia." On the basis of information obtained through contacts with Russian scientists, he said, "you will have to say that ten years from now the best scientists in the world will be found in Russia."

"I am not saying that this will happen unless we take this or that measure," Dr. Teller said, "I am simply saying that it is going to happen."

Dr. Teller said he saw no way to maintain United States scientific supremacy because of the long "lead time" it takes to educate scientists. The scientific manpower of ten years from now is today in the schools, he explained.

Now, we do not dispute Dr. Teller's assertion that "it is going to happen," but we are by no means so sure as he seems to be that it couldn't *conceivably* be prevented from happening. American experience during World War II showed that in a country as industrially advanced as the United States, the emergency mobilization of trained manpower and its utilization according to a rationally conceived plan can accomplish wonders. If the United States were

to initiate such an effort today, there is no reason to doubt that it could vastly increase the number of competent teachers almost overnight and sharply step up the rate of output of scientists and engineers in much less than ten years. This is not a matter of conjecture: we did it during the war, and thanks to that effort the manpower base from which we would start today is a great deal larger than it was in the early 1940s. As late as 1950, according to figures presented at the Instrumentation Hearings (p. 7), *the United States was graduating 52,000 engineers a year, which was nearly twice the Russian total of that year and more than twice the present United States total.*

Why the precipitous decline after 1950? Curiously enough, this question, which would seem to go to the heart of the problem of the present trained manpower shortage, was never even raised, let alone answered, in the Instrumentation Hearings. Unfortunately, we have not had the opportunity to undertake an independent investigation, but we would venture the guess that the basic reason was the tapering off of the educational supports provided under the GI Bill.

But whatever the precise explanation, there can be no doubt that *under the impact of war* the United States did in fact greatly increase its output of scientists, engineers, and technicians in a period of less than one decade. If the same thing cannot be done again in the next decade, the reason is by no means only or even mainly Dr. Teller's "lead time," important though that may be, but the fact that it is *only* under the impact of war that a capitalist country can rationally plan to achieve overall social goals.

The contrast with the Soviet Union could hardly be more striking. There the war brought a sharp curtailment of all educational activities: the country had to dip deep into its accumulated trained manpower pool to sustain the military effort. It was only *after* the effects of the war were substantially overcome that the present spectacular increases in the rate of output of technologically trained personnel began to show up. And it was at precisely the same time that the opposite trend set in in the United States. Between 1950 and 1954, the number of engineering degrees awarded in the USSR rose from 28,000 to 53,000; in the United States it fell from 52,000 to 22,000.

We do not conclude from these undoubted facts that the United States can or will do *nothing* to improve its technically trained manpower position. The Instrumentation Hearings show very clearly that responsible representatives of the American ruling class are thoroughly alarmed at the present situation, and are genuinely desirous of doing something to alleviate it. They understand, if still only dimly, that

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in a world of terrible poverty amidst potential plenty the future belongs to the social system that does the best job of harnessing the forces of nature to the purposes of man. Perhaps even more immediately compelling, the businessmen among them are feeling the pinch where it hurts most, in the profit-and-loss statement—and the more perceptive know that the worst is yet to come.

And yet, given the compulsions and limitations of an anarchic, profit-motivated social order, what can they do about it?

The sad truth is, not very much. Anyone disposed to doubt this should read and ponder the various lists of proposals and recommendations submitted by the witnesses at the Instrumentation Hearings. Take, for example, those of Professor Elmer C. Easton, Dean of the College of Engineering at Rutgers, who obviously knows what he is talking about in the field of engineering education. The overall targets which he enumerates are straightforward, and indeed quite modest: an expansion of engineering colleges to produce 50,000 graduates a year by 1970, more graduate study for more engineers, more two-year technical institutes, more vocational training schools, and expanded adult education programs.

But his recommendations for government action do not even touch the real issues: freeing space now used by the ROTC for other educational purposes, lowering interest rates for student housing projects, channeling government research contracts to colleges instead of to corporations, better utilization of government engineers and furnishing them with more technician assistance, increased federal aid to adult education. Earlier in his testimony, Dean Easton had stated explicitly that the number one problem of expanding the engineering schools is faculty, and that business is now enticing professors away from the colleges and universities. But on *this* issue—the crucial issue—he throws in the towel without a struggle: "Let me introduce this suggestion by saying that I am very strongly in favor of higher salaries for engineers. . . . The shortage of engineers has accelerated this trend as companies bid against each other for the services of the limited personnel. This is a natural operation of the law of supply and demand." What, then, is the suggestion? That companies with cost-plus defense contracts be somehow discouraged from raiding college faculties by offering exceptionally high salaries at the taxpayers' expense! But the "natural operation of the law of supply and demand"—there we touch upon the capitalist holy of holies, and far be it from the dean of an engineering school to bite the hand that feeds him.

The only trouble is that we are in our present fix precisely because of the "natural operation of the law of supply and demand," and as long as we bow down before it we shall remain there. Some

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of the witnesses seemed to sense this, and with unerring capitalist instinct to turn for salvation to the military, the one institution in bourgeois society which stands outside and above even the sacred law of supply and demand. The following, culled from the testimony of Mr. Sperry, the Illinois businessman whom we have already quoted above, illustrates this point of view:

The other point that I would like to discuss is the question of the role of the armed services that was brought up yesterday. . . . I am a small industrialist and my company employs probably from 60 to 70 technicians, and we would have been lost in this division of our business if we had not been able to get servicemen who had been trained as electronic technicians. This has been our biggest reservoir of supply, and by far the big majority of our technicians got their training in the armed services. I would like to make this point very strongly, because while we have heard many suggestions during these hearings that offer tremendous possibilities for the distant future, all of which I heartily concur with, here we have a mechanism that is working today although not as an instrument of national policy. It is an instrument of Army policy. . . . It has such an immediate possibility of returns because the mechanism is there. An organization that can train 150,000 men, whereas the whole educational picture only trains 50,000 technicians, certainly can be made into a useful tool. . . . You are spending money, and are proposing to encourage education in engineering. Yesterday you heard a very fine case made for the need for scientific education. This case has been made so well. But there should be some way of tying in our general educational program with regard to the sciences, with the immediate work of the Army, where there is this existing mechanism. It would seem that it would be possible to convince the Army that the long-range viewpoint of training men for industry is just as much a part, as the training of men to be Signal Corps men, and Air Corps technicians directly. (Pp. 140, 141, 142.)

Mr. Sperry evidently doesn't believe in pie in the sky. But he does believe in the army, and he has good reason to because he knows that most of the men who produce his profits got their training in the army. He is willing to settle for more like them.

But barring another world war, the armed forces are not likely to come to the rescue in a big way. The main burden of providing the country with additional trained manpower seems destined to fall on the civilian educational system in a regime dominated by the "natural operation of the law of supply and demand." We already know what to expect from that.

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, goes in for what might

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be called the "planned operation of the law of supply and demand," and at the present stage the core of the plan is more and better scientists, engineers, and technicians. We have had enough experience by now to know what to expect from that, too.

(March 12, 1957)

AN INTERVIEW WITH NEHRU

BY LEO HUBERMAN

The interview reported below took place on February 5th but arrived in New York too late for inclusion in the March issue.—THE EDITORS

Question: Your Five Year Plan is an impressive document, and the planning officials appear to be extremely competent. What are the obstacles to the successful implementation of the Plan?

The Plan involves a considerable stepping up of the rate of saving and investment, which necessarily imposes a strain on the people. We can get over that strain only through the willing co-operation of the entire population. One difficulty is that the benefits of the Plan do not percolate down to everybody at once. For some there are tangible benefits right away, for others there is no immediate gain.

Right now we are having an election campaign, and we face opposition from two sources: (1) The opposition of the parties that are formally opposed to us. (2) The conscious or unconscious opposition of old habits of mind, of tradition, inertia, and so on. This is more important and more difficult to deal with.

The Plan will be successful to the extent that it evokes not only passive consent but the willing cooperation and enthusiasm of the people. In authoritarian countries, every attempt is made to create a favorable psychological attitude toward the Plan. It is much easier to create such an atmosphere if contrary voices are not raised. In our democratic structure, however, critics are loud in their opposition. We want and welcome this criticism. Nevertheless, an atmosphere is created against which we must fight all the time.

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Question: Your announced goal is a "socialist pattern of society." Is socialism the answer only for the underdeveloped countries, or will the West turn to it also?

Wouldn't you say that not socialism, perhaps, but socialization has spread in many other countries? Even in the United States conditions are different from what they were, and the trend is unmistakable. But perhaps the European countries are a better example, since they have been harder hit. There the tendency will be to go toward more and more socialization.

The only question that troubles me is how to combine social progress with the fullest democracy. We in India would rather slow down our economic advance and go ahead on democratic lines.

Question: Is the danger of world war greater or less than it was a year ago?

There is no doubt that in the last few months tensions have grown, and the cold war has again come back.

There is great reluctance on all sides to go into a war. The danger lies in some odd thing happening which may precipitate a crisis.

Question: Has the attitude toward neutralism changed as a result of your visit to the United States?

I should imagine that, without agreement, there is a fuller appreciation of our position.

Question: What advice can you give socialists in the United States?

I hesitate to give any advice. Our setup in India is different. We have gone through a great deal of conditioning by Gandhi, which has affected our thinking very much in the direction of non-violence.

One of the unfortunate results of Marxism and Communism has been the stress on conflict. To accentuate conflicts and to harp upon violence as a method do not seem to me to be the correct approach to the problems the world faces.

The stress on violence, plus a succession of world wars, has coarsened the human fiber. While it may be true that no one dealing with public affairs can renounce the use of violence completely, it is altogether a different thing to lay stress on it. There is a growing awareness that violence may end in the annihilation of everybody, but the recognition of this fact has not driven people to seek other approaches.

Socialists tend to become rather sectarian. They get so lost in their own theses and arguments that they lose touch with the masses. Then they rail at the masses, but they themselves are at fault.

AN ASIAN VIEW OF EGYPT AND ISRAEL

BY K. B. THAKORE

This article was sent to us by an American who has been living in India for several years. The author, who writes from New Delhi, is described as a young Indian. Our correspondent writes that he has shown it to others of his Indian friends "who tell me that it is a very mild statement compared with what they would put on paper."—THE EDITORS

In Indian opinion, Israel, by invading Egypt in conjunction with the Franco-British attack on Suez, has committed the unforgivable sin. It must be said that the Israeli action did not come altogether as a surprise to us. Rather, it served to confirm the suspicions with which India has tended to regard Israel since the founding of the two young republics. The international principle to which India is devoted above all others is the defense of the newly independent nations of Asia and Africa against any reimposition of foreign rule. Israel's *de facto* collaboration with the two imperial powers in an assault upon a Bandung country amounts, as we see it here, to proof that she cannot be depended upon to act as a trustworthy member of the Asian community.

In developing its policy towards Israel, India has been not unnaturally mindful of the sentiments of the forty odd million Muslims within our own population. A surprisingly large fraction of the Indian Muslims at one time or another in their lives come into direct contact with their Arab co-religionists when they make the prescribed pilgrimage to Mecca. It is also true that because of partition and the subsequent difficulties with Pakistan, India has been even more anxious than she might otherwise have been to gain and hold the good will of the Muslim nations of Western Asia. Nonetheless, consular relations with Israel were established and still exist. On sheerly human grounds, Indians have felt great sympathy for the victims of Nazi persecution. There have also been intermittent evidences of interest in Israel's technological and welfare achievements. But the overriding Indian attitude has been one of doubt as to the genuine nature of the state which the Israelis were building at the gateway of Asia.

Indians are quite capable of appreciating the contrast between the political, economic, and social backwardness of most of the Arab countries and the humming modernity of Israel. Normally, our affinities would be all on the side of the desert-reclamation schemes, the Dead Sea chemical projects, the socialistic agricultural coopera-

tives, and so forth. In this case, however, Indians take a more long-term view. We believe that in time progressive forces are bound to arise within the sheikdoms, kingdoms, military dictatorships, and upper-class oligarchies of the Arabian peninsula. Not immediately, but inevitably new elements from the educated classes will replace the older ruling groups and undertake government in the name of the people. In part, this process has already begun. Haltingly, unevenly, no doubt with relapses into despotism or demagoguery, the Arabs will come to tread the path toward political democracy and economic transformation. Like India, they will have to contend with a backlog of poverty, disease, and entrenched social disparity. Like India, they will find the going hard. If, however, we have faith in our own ability to build a better life for ourselves, we must also have faith in the eventual success of the entire former colonial world.

With Israel the situation is altogether different. The factories, hospitals, and research institutes which command our admiration have been developed not by the indigenous population but primarily by foreign intruders bringing with them their European attitudes and cultural habits as well as their European skills and techniques. The dominant elements in Israel have brought to Palestine a ready-made civilization based on the industrial strength of Europe and America. They have bent their efforts toward creating a stream-lined sanitary Garden of Eden within a bristling fortress wall. We have seen how the British used to recreate their own world in India, including many excellent features such as universities, health services, and parliamentary procedures. But they were careful to build their houses in separate sections, away from the dust and flies of our bazaars. Frankly speaking, it looks to us as though the Israelis as well are willing to live in Asia, but not to live as Asians.

Then there is the question of economic independence. We in India, as is well known, are of several minds about the wisdom of accepting material aid from abroad, particularly from the United States. In certain moods and at certain times, we proclaim self-righteously that we would prefer to do completely without. Usually, however, we realize that we have a lot to gain by taking with good grace whatever dollars, pounds, rubles, marks, grain, locomotives, technical services, or other boons are offered, so long as our basic right to decide our own political and economic destiny is recognized. We have, however, the good fortune to be a large country and one that can scarcely be ignored. As a result, we have received assistance through so many channels that we find ourselves obligated to numerous donors rather than to any single patron.

Israel, by contrast, is a tiny land. In addition to the requirements of its own population it has assumed the special burden of providing

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a haven for a limitless stream of immigrants. Economically, there has never been a question of self-sufficiency. Israel has been kept going only by massive injections of American funds. Even the communal farms have been able to survive largely because of American financial guarantees. Under these circumstances, we do not see how Israel can pursue a foreign policy of its own. In effect it must act so as to please the United States, or it cannot continue to enjoy American largesse. Indians would begin to take seriously Israeli protestations of independence if they saw Israel renounce American dollars. But we suspect that the Israelis place a lower value on their standing in the eyes of other Asians than on their determination to provide a European standard of living.

Both in terms of official policy and popular feeling, the approach to Egypt is much simpler. Egypt, like India, is a former colonial nation trying to maintain its footing in the slippery sands of international politics. President Nasser we recognize as the acknowledged leader of the Egyptian people. We think of him in the same category, say, as U Nu, the former premier of Burma, or "Jojo" of Indonesia. We are used to seeing him in newsreels in friendly conversation with Pandit Nehru or Mr. Krishna Menon. Thinking people here are well aware that present-day Egypt is weak on civil liberties and parliamentary methods. Looking around, however, at other nations in Asia and Europe, India does not find Egypt particularly notable for these deficiencies. We tend to take our own freedoms, such as they are, very seriously. On the other hand, we accept quite frankly the need for maintaining cordial relations with many countries which would not pass rigid tests for political democracy. Thus India (like the United States) exerts herself to remain on the best possible terms with the tribal autocracy of Saudi Arabia, the less-than-constitutional monarchy of Iran, and the authoritarian Communist government of Yugoslavia.

What, it is asked here, would be the conceivable alternative to rule by Colonel Nasser in Egypt? In view of Egypt's recent political history, could we seriously expect a genuinely representative regime? In effect, the choice would lie among the reinstatement of the discredited king, the establishment of a British puppet, the rise of a more extreme type of nationalist leader, or a collapse into semi-anarchy. Given these circumstances, Indians are tempted to suppose that President Nasser is about the best leader the Egyptians are likely to have at this moment. We also know him as a man who, if impulsive in action, has proved responsive to Indian counsels of moderation. The Indian attitude might perhaps be compared with that of an understanding elder brother who knows that the younger boy has been sowing wild oats but feels that he is capable of better things

and wants him to be given a chance to outgrow this stage.

What, then, of the future? Can Israel continue to exist, holding on by the skin of its teeth to a bite of Asia, but drawing its nourishment artificially from abroad? No nation, as we see things in India, can live in security except by securing the friendship of its neighbors. After so many years of hostility topped off by the recent adventure, it will not be easy for Israel to win the confidence of the Arab states which surround her. Yet this is the only genuine guarantee she can ever obtain.

One thing is clear: Israel cannot gain friends by continuing her present policies. For small nations as well as for giants, the road to peace lies not through military build-ups and preventive wars, but through mutual accommodation and willingness to negotiate. If we hope to bridle the United States and the Soviet Union, we can scarcely condone resort to arms by lesser states. The current situation is so taut that any time a gun is fired across a frontier, the peace of the whole world is endangered. Only by a thin line of luck did we escape the outbreak of international war over the Suez incident.

Certainly we in India do not desire the annihilation of Israel. Yet we feel that the Israelis under their present leadership are calling their own doom upon themselves. We wonder whether there may not be within the country at least a handful of far-sighted patriots capable of a supreme effort to come to terms with the surrounding nations on a basis of equality and humility. Unless Israel can make amends for the damage she has caused and turn her back firmly on her past direction, she can expect no quarter at the hands of the Arab countries and no tears from the rest of Asia.

FOOTNOTE TO RECENT HISTORY

A huge new oil strike in the Sahara Desert south of Algiers is being described by American oilmen as "bigger than Texas." Vast oil resources, comparable to those of the Middle East, are beginning to be seen for this desert area in French territory. Access to this oil is becoming a big stake in the Algerian war.

—U.S. News & World Report, January 25, 1957

AMERICAN RADICALISM— PAST AND FUTURE

BY JOSEPH STAROBIN

These days most of us are trying to find some "view from the bridge" that will make the past more intelligible, and provide us with the understanding of our present so as to make the future more effective. Whenever men pause to ask themselves just where it is they are going, they usually glance backward to where they have come from. This is particularly true for Americans, whose history has been so remarkable for its discontinuity. American institutions have been in such a "perpetual mobility," as Emerson said, that each generation has found it difficult to discover a tradition which sons can share with fathers. When the dynamics of contemporary life seem most difficult to fathom, the past grows in relevance.

Just how relevant this past is, however, is the very question that arises from the new anthology, *American Radicals: Some Problems and Personalities*,* assembled by Harvey Goldberg, of Ohio State University and Dr. William A. Williams, of the University of Oregon. They are joined by a dozen or so teachers at leading and lesser-known colleges, as well as by several editors and journalists, each of whom contributes a profile of an outstanding American radical, fourteen in all. Three general essays give a perspective to these studies. One of these is the preface itself on the whys and wherefores of American radical thought; another is the powerful summary of the pattern of repression since the century's beginning, in which William Preston, of Denison University, shows how short and fitful have been the years that were relatively free of persecution; and then there is the penetrating analysis of the renegades from the radical tradition by Russell Fraser, of Princeton.

It is an exhilarating panorama, this flashback on who the American radicals were and what they contributed. Few will read it without genuine excitement and pride in our heritage. There was Big Bill Haywood "with the physical strength of an ox, a big head, and a tremendous jaw . . . careless, violent, ready and fit to deal blow for blow," who came out of the mining camps of the Rockies and went to a lonely death in faraway Moscow. Carl Hein of Buffalo

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State Teachers College tells the saga in modulated tones that heighten the power of the man and his tempestuous deeds. Eugene Victor Debs was made of a gentler mold, yet he also (as Bert Cochran, editor of *The American Socialist* describes him) "struck a spark wherever he went, and was the only left-wing leader around whom a personal legend grew up." And the third among the socialist leaders was Daniel De Leon who tried to grapple with basic issues: just how socialism would come, and what was America's priority in achieving it, and what sort of Marxist party would be needed. Five years ago, the centennial of De Leon's birth went almost unnoticed, but as David Herreshoff of the University of Minnesota points out, De Leon anticipated many of Lenin's ideas, and "American radicals live with the heritage of De Leon almost as much as they do with the heritage of Debs."

Four political figures do not fall in the socialist tradition, and yet what powerful radicals they were! Fighting Bob La Follette, for example, whose bitter, life-long crusade against monopoly spanned the age when America was "thickening to empire." The heartbreak of it is recalled by Charles Madison whose own *Critics and Crusaders*, ten years back, forms a fine companion piece to the Goldberg-Williams book. And there was the "Eagle Forgotten," John Peter Altgeld, who knew how to maneuver and to wait, as he did in the Haymarket case, who tried so hard to remake the Democratic Party when the Populist tide seemed to render that ever-elusive quest of American radicals so promising. Altgeld was a radical, as Russell Fraser says, who "stayed the course." Richard Sasuly evokes "the Peoples Politician," Vito Marcantonio, in a thumbnail sketch which it is hard to read without a twinge of pain. Not only is it so early to gain a perspective on "Marc," but it seems so unreal to yield him up to the niche in the radical Hall of Fame he surely deserves. Finally, a Rodinesque figure of the distant past, John Brown of Bleeding Kansas and Harper's Ferry. Southern newspaperman Alfred Maund, who recreates the unforgettable story, also contributes one of the best lines in the book when he says that Brown was one of those men "whose mouldering bodies form the nightmares of masters; from their bones come pikes for slaves."

A rather different group of men, drawn from various origins and ranging through literature, the academic world, and public service in general make up the balance of these profiles. Dr. Williams offers a perceptive study of Charles A. Beard in the paradoxical, not-too-satisfactory category of "Tory-radical" whose "radical insights into the malfunctioning of the existing system were never matched by an equally fundamental program for its renovation." And Thorstein Veblen is ranked by Arthur K. Davis, of the University of

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Vermont, as "the most original social thinker of his time." For all of Veblen's iconoclasm and suspicion of the utopian streak in Marxian thought, it was to Marx that he owed so much of his brilliance.

In recounting the great place which middle-class reformers have played in our history, Harvey O'Connor singles out Henry Demarest Lloyd. Lloyd anticipated, with his *Wealth Against Commonwealth*, the pioneer study of the Rockefellers, much of the muckraking of a later generation; he went straight to the hottest crossfire of the class struggle with his exposure of the coal barons in their fight against the Illinois coal miners. The savor of the man is left in one of his epigrams: "The Standard [Oil Trust] has done everything with the Pennsylvania legislature except to refine it." And virtually unknown in a land whose first chief justice was John Jay is the maverick great grandson, John Jay Chapman, the gadfly of New York society at the turn of the century, described by Melvin Bernstein of Alfred University. I was struck by Chapman's foray into journalism, with his four-page broadside, entitled *The Political Nursery*—somehow it reminds me of a similar publication in our own time. Why, of course, it was the forerunner of *I. F. Stone's Weekly*, and incidentally it is to "Izzy's" thirty-five years of crusading journalism that the book as a whole is so appropriately dedicated.

In a deeper vein of doubt and tragedy is the career of Walter Weyl, who was at the height of his fame as a middle-class reformer when he came upon the Lawrence, Massachusetts, textile strike which the IWW led so heroically. Charles B. Forcey, of Columbia, describes how this experience haunted Weyl to the end, as he grappled with the implications of his unfinished book, *The Class War*, and asked: "Is our democratic government adaptable and can it be made adaptable . . . to the real Industrial Democratization such as the people want?" For, like Lloyd in Chicago, Walter Weyl had a sense of how deeply socialist aspirations lay unformed in our people, a sense of the "unrepresented socialism" that wells up within them.

Finally, two quite different men stalk these pages, each of them brooding in his distinct brilliance, scaling the heights of their worlds and finding what they saw so dismal. One of these was Heywood Broun; the essay about him, by Harvey Goldberg, so comprehending of his foibles and yet of his radical steadfastness, has already appeared in these pages. The other is Theodore Dreiser, "the first important writer to come from the non-Anglo-Saxon tradition, the lower class tradition," who expressed the hurts and the fumbling passions and inner chaos of those millions who helped build a country in which they did not quite feel at home. The perceptive essay by John Lydenberg, of Hobart and William Smith Colleges, points out that while so many other radicals were evangelists, Christian reformers,

politicians, or guerrilla fighters, the best view of Dreiser was given by himself: "Ishmael, a wanderer."

It would be easy to cavil at the open spaces in these selections, granted that the authors lay no claim to comprehensiveness. I should have wanted to see Frederick Douglass assessed as a radical. And there are many other men and women (in fact, the great feminine tradition nowhere appears here) who were part of the good fight and the goodly company. But the big question that rises up is what this great past tells us, if it does at all, for our own time?

One of the striking things in the American radical tradition is the deep tendency to schisms, the inability of men and movements they shaped to find a common ground. The whole story is full of a certain "rugged individualism," or better yet a certain denominationalism, in which so much of our country's history was molded. How the power of American reaction has always been underestimated! What Veblen called "the massive drift of large, uncontrolled social forces and the grip of traditional and obsolete institutions" was taken so lightly in the luxuriation of radical disagreements. The memory of the Debs movement is often invoked today as the example of a broadly-based movement in which there was room for dissent; yet it comes as something of a shock that six months before the presidential campaign in which Debs got almost a million votes, no fewer than 40,000 left-wingers, with Haywood in the van, were "clubbed out of the party." Haywood himself was determined to organize the most oppressed, and he spurned the illusions of reformists in the American Federation of Labor. But when he justified his course on the grounds that "the skilled worker is today exploiting the labor beneath him, the unskilled man, just as much as the capitalist is," we are struck by how primitive and excessive this point of view was. It is the hallmark of a sectarianism that in the long run undermines its own heroism. De Leon was of course notorious for his intolerance; yet even he seems to have recognized the high price of it in his pathetic phrase: "What Debs can do I can't do, and what I can do, Debs can't do." Still, this wisdom did not save him from his own isolation.

It was the same later on. La Follette denounced the support which the Communists finally proffered his ticket in 1924, and thirty years later, Marcantonio and the Communists are unable to compose their differences for the sake of some effectiveness at the low ebb of the radical tides. Heywood Broun, only three years previously a recruit to the Socialist Party, was expelled from it in April, 1933, because he spoke on behalf of Tom Mooney on a common platform with Communists. I know that deep reasons of history can be invoked for the tendency of the American Left to fragment. The working

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population was in flux and formation; and different segments of non-proletarian groups and classes were swept into the radical stream and often precipitated out of it at different rates. The purity of principles is important, and unity, when conceived as a catch-all of profound divergences, can be deceptive. Yet, indigenous as this tendency to internal scissions has been, I wonder whether it can be afforded in the future. Something of a broader gauge, more tolerant of diverging objectives and more conserving of immediate energies, will have to be found.

It is striking also that American radicalism has had so little of an overall view of the dynamics of American development, both domestic and in its relation to the world as a whole. I mean a theory of how socialism might come about. No agreement was ever reached on the place of reforms in the passage to revolutionary change, just as the problem of how radicals could retain their identity and yet function within the labor movement, without "boring from within" or establishing "dual unions," has wracked our history without being effectively resolved. The relation of the struggle of the Negro for complete equality—to which radicals as a whole paid rather small attention before the first World War—was hardly worked out. In the days of the Non-Partisan League of North Dakota, as Robert Morlan has shown in his book *Political Prairie Fire*, socialists were divided in their attitude toward the embattled farmers.

Above all, the conception of the future revolution was vague: it was usually enough to speak of The Social Revolution with a certain evangelical universalism, as though a socialist society would either come pretty much at once on a world scale, or if it came in any one country, it would automatically and rapidly succeed everywhere else, and by the same pattern. Of all the radicals, De Leon probed most deeply in this respect. I should have wanted David Herreshoff to cite the many passages in "Flashlights on the Amsterdam Congress," relating De Leon's visit to the Socialist International's meeting in 1904. He complained continuously how little the flowering of American productive levels was appreciated abroad, how deeply influenced by semi-feudal conditions the European radicals were, and De Leon gropingly approached the conclusion that an American path to socialism would have to find its distinctive way.

Yet, the universalism won out. When the Russian Revolution came, it was easy and understandable that the most native radicals saw in Russia the model and pattern of their own path. This Rusophilism, which Goldberg and Williams credit in their introduction as one of the barriers to the success of American radicals, stemmed not only from the inflexibilities of the Communist International, and the domination of the Russians within it, all of which should be

granted. It stemmed also from this absence of any sense of the interrelations between revolutions. No one seems to have considered that the Russian Revolution was uniquely the product of its own history and Russian background. For the very reason of its success, the history of the world would be changed so that revolutionary progress in the industrialized countries of the West might take wholly different paths. Thus the best of intentions turned into a sort of passionate involvement which was an escape from American realities.

But the main factor in the weakness of American radicalism, our authors insist, is the very concept of never-ending expansionism. "America's central conception of the world, or philosophy of history, has always rested on the assumption that there was enough at hand, or within easy reach, to meet and satisfy the needs and desires of all segments of the nation." And this was no mere illusion. "This presumption was anchored well enough in the realities of immediate experience to circumscribe the radical analysis of society, and to limit its effectiveness in acquiring sufficient power to effect fundamental changes in the institutions and mores of America." Thus American radicals, many of whose proposals have come to be accepted under capitalism, are also the "prisoners of their own experience."

Russell Fraser makes a similar point as he deals with the impact of the "American Dream." His essay on why the defectors break away and sublimate their defeats by a sort of "titanic rage" against themselves and their own past is one of the most penetrating in the book. Fraser feels that American radicals have been "exquisitely cursed," for the Left of no other country has to withstand "an indigenous narcotic so enervating as the American Dream." It is the Dream of indefinite progress, inducing a Darwinian sense of certain movement in a forward upward direction; this feeling of American uniqueness (which Fraser admits to be real, and yet is not quite so sure about either) that accounts for the lack of a sense of theory, and explains the deep hold of pragmatic philosophy in American life and politics. The myths linger on, even when the reality has turned to something else. "Tradition is never more insistent than when the forces which go to create it are spent."

Is this, perhaps, the fate of American radicals, that they will propose, and that history will dispose, and that in helping to realize their own objectives, they will be baffled and frustrated? Perhaps the very concept of what they want needs to be re-examined, for it may be coming about in ways and forms they have not anticipated, and by the action of much larger forces than those which they can claim to lead? Such questions do arise in my mind, since it is so clear from these very pages how much has changed in American life and

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in the world since the days of Debs. As Goldberg and Williams express it, however, the "last round-up" is not far off; history has worked its paradoxical way through the ironies of seeming dead-ends to open new highroads of advance. They see "the necessary pre-conditions for a truly American radicalism" arising in large part because of new world circumstances to which the existence of Russia and China has contributed, not as models for Americans, but as facts which circumscribe the freedom for the expansion of American capitalism, limiting its ability to externalize its problems, driving it back to its internal dynamic. Thus, they say—and I find this the most challenging thought in the book—"no American radicalism could arise and become effective unless and until the United States found itself forced to choose between, on the one hand, a war that threatened it with devastation, and on the other, a reorganization of American society." It is this circumstance, thinking in terms of the whole era ahead, which may "offer American radicals their most promising opportunity of the twentieth century."

Loyalty is not conformity. . . . It is allegiance to the traditions of freedom, equality, democracy, tolerance. It is a realization that America was born of revolt, flourished on dissent, became great through experimentation.

—Henry Steele Commager, *Freedom, Loyalty, Dissent*

In the midst of all our miseries and all the injustices committed or suffered, we must have faith in human nature. He who has lost the sense of grandeur and infinite potentialities of mankind is self-condemned never to understand his fellow men.

Such faith is aware that the forces of good, of wisdom and light and justice need the help of time, and that the night of slavery and ignorance cannot be dispersed by a sudden flash of light, but only by a long series of flickering dawns.

—Jean Jaurés

THE WORLD OF SCIENCE

by Philip Morrison

You Still Don't Know What Electricity Is, Anyway

There is a wry recollection which every physicist shares. Some conversation on the problems or the successes of physics is terminated by the banal phrase of the title above. That an elementary but contemporary account of the physicist's concept of electricity would be useful was suggested by an explicit question of one of the editors of *MONTHLY REVIEW*. He put the question without the complacency of the usual conversationalist, but he made it clear that the school text and the popular accounts gave him no conceptual scheme in which to order the innumerable and constantly-multiplying examples of electrical or electronic technology.

It is plain that to answer for an arbitrary skeptic his query about the real nature of a chair or an argument, let alone electricity, is not easy. The epistemological doubts which can be introduced into any question of existence are of course not fewer in the physicist's domain. But he can remain unmoved by them. For there is little question that we understand more of the nature and the properties of electricity in all its Protean manifestations than we do about gravity, or about solid matter, or about the history of the earth. The theory of electricity, no less than its practical fruit, remains the model of success for the physicist, a success which we owe to the individual genius of a long line of investigators from Franklin to Einstein, and to the steady social growth of technology and its scientific by-products.

There is an intrinsic reason for this success. The force of gravity, even more evident to the unaided senses than electrical phenomena, is a property of the earth, the sun, and other such huge aggregates of matter. It is not possible as yet for us to manipulate the sources of this force in the laboratory except in a most limited and tedious way; we are constrained to study gravitation by observation, without much of the conscious intervention which makes experiment so powerful. Gravity is superhuman in its scale. In the converse way, the most powerful of forces, the nuclear forces, which bind together the nuclear heart of matter, are difficult to study, for they have no counterpart on the human scale, and their study is restricted to the most indirect, subtle, and powerful of laboratory means. But electricity,

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as we shall see, is the force which lies closest at hand; it is the cause of chemical change, it lies behind the specific nature of all forms of matter. It can be studied in the most intimate way on the human scale, for we ourselves and all our artifacts reflect its properties. We can say with confidence that in the most remote stars and in the atom itself, the properties of electricity are precisely those which we find in our laboratory, and this identity can be quantitatively established to a part in a hundred million!

The contexts in which electricity can be recognized are diverse beyond imagination; three familiar ones will do as reminder. The light by which we read, and the mechanical power which spins the shafts of industry, may serve as one; the instantaneous and remote image which flickers wonderfully across the TV screen, another; the curious currents which the physician records in his electrocardiograph for an estimate of the heart's strength, a third.

All these phenomena may be said, in a mutation of a famous definition of Engels, to comprise the mode of existence of certain fundamental atomic objects, the electric charges. Every one of the many types of still unanalyzed particulate entities into which matter has by now been broken is found to possess a definite amount of a certain property: electric charge. The charge is definable by its mechanical effect upon similar charges. Each particle we know has either one single unit of charge, or absolutely none at all. Just as universal gravitation binds all known matter, apple and moon, star or sparrow, with an attractive force, so the atomic particles feel the force of all other particles with charge. But here, as everyone recalls, there are two types of charge—which we call positive and negative, arbitrarily—and like charges repel, unlikes attract. "Neutral" particles remain wholly unaffected.

The origin of the remarkable simplicity of this property: that every particle possesses an equal share of one of the two kinds of charge, or else none at all, is perhaps the most fundamental of all the unsolved problems of physics. Charge, moreover, remains constant in every physical process. Even the most penetrating and energetic of atom-smashing machines has not once produced or destroyed any charge at all. Mass can be created from energy, motion is easy to originate or to suppress, but charge is for us eternal. Indeed, we can create charged particles from energy well enough, but only in pairs of opposite charge, so that the net charge resulting, like that with which we start, is zero. We cannot predict the size of the fundamental unit of charge; it remains for us the unanalyzed determiner of the nature of matter. The final physical theory must, we feel, give some account of the strength of this fundamental unit; no one has yet produced any clear sign of a successful theory of this sort. Indeed, the

last decades of Professor Einstein's marvelously productive career were devoted to a search for this ultimate theory, which he believed he may have found. But so far its intricacies have yielded no single verifiable conclusion along these lines.

Grant the physicist this place to stand, and he can move the world. Accept the fact of the constitution of all matter out of a collection of such unit charges, arranged in more or less complex aggregates, moving and spinning, and from their simply-formulable properties of interaction, the appearance of the world, all the phenomena of electricity included, can with ever-increasing reliability and richer detail be derived. One must add, to be sure, that besides the simple forces mimicking gravitation there are more complex forces which arise from the motion of charges, which we recognize as magnetic. The fundamental particles bear in general fundamental magnets, as well as unit charges. Such magnetism is not quite so simple; some of it may well arise from internal motion of the particles themselves, as by spinning around an axis. The familiar toy magnets reveal the inner unseen motion of their atomic charged constituents; the large-scale manifestations of electricity—like lightning, or the spark of static electricity from your hand to the door-knob on a winter's day—reveal the summed effects of a great many of the tiny fundamental charges.

For the first and most important realization is that the atoms of matter are held together by electrical forces. The electron bears a unit negative charge, and the nucleus, heart of every atom, a definite number of positive charges. The nucleus contains a number of protons, each one of which bears its unit positive charge, and some neutrons, carrying their name because they are electrically neutral. The nucleus stays together for non-electrical reasons, else clearly the neutral particles would be hard to hold, but all the rest of matter, from sun to rock, from paper to steel to water to flesh, is bound by the electrical forces.

The ubiquity of the electrical charges in their great numbers—it is a commonplace that the atoms are extraordinarily small on a human scale—is the origin of the visible manifestations of electricity. The electrical forces are very strong on the atomic scale. It is they which in the end maintain the integrity of the atoms, not to speak of the solidity of a steel bar. They do not display themselves on the large scale in the ordinary course of things, for they are neutralized. Every piece of matter big as a dust grain contains an equal number of positive and of negative charges; the overall result is neutral, neutrality enforced by a balance of great but opposing forces. When the balance is disturbed even a little, the strength of the electric forces is such that spectacular results follow. A thunder

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cloud is charged by a complex process we cannot outline in detail, involving mass motions of drops of rain and hail, and the heat extracted from condensing water vapor. Some of this energy is spent in separating electric charges, so that in a resulting cloud there may have accumulated an excess of one kind of charge. Such an excess cannot well accumulate spontaneously, for the particles repel each other. Energy has been spent to produce it, and that energy is now stored in the charge maldistribution. Electric forces are so strong that an imbalance, a net charge, of only a millionth of a millionth of one percent can cause the thunderbolt.

So it is with all the electrical phenomena. Chemical reactions themselves are very frequently simply the motion of unit charges from one atom to another. The battery is a device in which such electron transfers are promoted, resulting in the freeing of some charge at the expense of a chemical change of the materials themselves. Corrosion, digestion, solution of salt in water: all these, and many more, reflect the profound effect of charge transfer in every atom of a reacting mass. Static charges, whether built up as one walks across the rug, or in the thunderhead, are far less intense than those of chemical change, and correspond to relatively tiny charge displacements. Currents, like those in lighting or power lines, represent the flow of electrons along a copper wire. Some mechanical force, like that of falling water or expanding steam, has been made to push against charges at one end of the conductor. These charges repel their neighbors, and so the energy is transferred in the motion of the charges within the solid metals of the wire. At the end of the line the motion may be arrested in a lamp filament. The collisions between the moving electrons and the atoms of the filament wire shake incessantly the atoms of the wire. This agitation is nothing else than heat; the filament glows white-hot.

The transfer of energy by the intermediation of the moving stream of charge is the nature of the distribution of electric power. This power may be converted into motion and force, as in the magnets and coils of electric motors, or into heat, or it may be used to extract or insert electric charge into the atoms of substances, producing chemical transformation, as in the reduction of the metal aluminum from its ores. These ends are served by the myriad-branched power network of every developed land. So energy is distributed over the land in the silent, unguessed flow of electrons in solid metal. When the autumn hurricane a few years ago felled the old elms of my little town in scores, the trees brought down power line after power line. As the lines fell, their energy flow was spilled to the ground: the rush of the moving charge lit the sky all night. Besides these recurrent flashes, those of the lightning paled. Even in this small town,

the man-made energy flow, ordinarily contained without incident in the thin cables, far exceeded the Jovian display.

But the efficient distribution of energy in the flow of charge is by no means the only major use of electricity. It must be realized that one charge does not instantly feel the effect of another. Time is required for the impulse to travel from one charge to another which it repels. That time is just the time required for a light signal to cross the same distance. Electric forces travel at the speed of light. There is no faster physical transmission. Moreover, the charges themselves, in the case of the electrons, are the most mobile of all matter. For these reasons, the transfer of electrical energy, the motion of charge, is the most rapid and facile of all means of producing physical effects. When you push on one end of a stick, the other moves only considerably later. For an instant, the stick is compressed and shortened. The motion is transferred at the speed of sound, some half a mile a second. But electric impulses can be transferred with a few hundred thousand times greater speed. And even the smallest impulse can be transferred at the highest speed. Thus arises the signalling property of electrical phenomena: telegraph, telephone, and radio. The forces may be transmitted by the chain of charges, as in the wires, or through empty space, as in radio. The exquisite sensitivity of individual electrons, moving not in simple metal wires, but in a vacuum, or within specially-structured crystals, provides the basis for the detection of the weakest impulses emanating from charges surging in the antenna of a radio transmitter across the world. And vision itself is the response of the charges within special molecules of the retina to the pulsing of atomic charges in the source. Light is but radio whose transmitting and receiving equipment is atomic in scale. The speed and sensitivity of electrical phenomena, the development of means by which a weak electrical force is caused to determine the actions of a local, stronger, source of the same kind: these are the foundations on which has been built the wonderful structure of electronics, of automatic machinery, of control and counting instruments of every kind. Most of the quick-response, complex, and sensitive instruments of science depend on the employment of electrical forces. The balance wheel of a watch is a wonderful mechanism, but it is gross and sluggish and inflexible compared to a beam of electrons. The "moving parts" of electronic machines are small beyond vision and light beyond touch. They can split a second a billion times, and quite easily reveal the restless dance of individual atoms. How they work is a wonder, but it is no mystery. It is the consequence of the nature of electric charge.

The theory of electromagnetic phenomena has grown to maturity with its technological employment. To the classical elegances of the

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sanguine genius of the Cambridge professor of the seventies, Clark Maxwell, there have been added the triumph of Einstein's relativity and the quantum mechanics of Bohr and his colleagues. For in fact the theory of electricity has replaced the theory of Newtonian mechanics as the model and the exemplar of modern systems of the world. When relativity came into its present reign over our concepts of space and time, it was a victory for Maxwell and electric force over classical mechanics. Today we still derive our analogues for all working quantum theories of the sub-atomic world from the beautiful and precise theory of electromagnetic phenomena. On the tested premise of the existence and nature of the fundamental charge units, there rests today not only the extraordinary technology of electricity, but the whole conceptual framework of modern physics. We do not know everything; that is more than plain. But some way into the nature of electricity it has been within the power of science to penetrate. On that penetration rests the working world.

To accumulate lasting property for himself is impossible. What better thing can [the worker] do, then, when he gets high wages, than live well upon them? The English bourgeoisie is violently scandalized at the extravagant living of the workers when wages are high; yet it is not only very natural but very sensible of them to enjoy life when they can, instead of laying up treasures which are of no lasting use to them, and which in the end moth and rust (i.e., the bourgeoisie) get possession of.

—Friedrich Engels, *Condition of the Working Class in England*, 1844

THE DECLINE OF FEUDALISM AND THE RISE OF THE BOURGEOISIE

BY FRIEDRICH ENGELS

This is a translation of a pamphlet entitled "Ueber den Verfall des Feudalismus und das Aufkommen der Bourgeoisie," published in East Germany in 1953. The translator is John K. Dickinson. The publisher explains in a preliminary note that it was found among Engels' posthumous papers, a fragment without title or date. The single footnote, referring to a book published in 1874, would seem to fix the earliest possible date. So far as we know, this is the first time the essay has been published in English.

Engels' views on the subject of the decline of feudalism and the rise of the bourgeoisie will be particularly interesting to those who have followed the discussion initiated by my review of Maurice Dobb's *Studies in the Development of Capitalism* which appeared in *Science & Society*, Spring 1950. Participants in this discussion were, besides Dobb and myself, Professor H. K. Takahashi, and Messrs. Rodney Hilton and Christopher Hill.

All of these papers were subsequently collected in booklet form (*The Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism*, obtainable from *Science & Society* at a price of \$1 per copy), and collateral discussions have taken place in several other countries. It is perhaps not out of place for me to remark that if I interpret Engels correctly, he brings support to the position I upheld in the *Science & Society* discussion—support which is the more welcome in view of the fact that all the other participants seemed to be on the other side.—PAUL M. SWEETZ

While the chaotic battles among the dominant feudal nobility were filling the Middle Ages with sound and fury, the quiet labors of the oppressed classes all over Western Europe were undermining the feudal system and creating a state of affairs in which there was less and less room for the feudal lords. True, in the countryside, the feudality might still assert itself, torturing the serfs, flourishing on their sweat, riding down their crops, ravishing their wives and daughters. But cities were rising everywhere: in Italy, in Southern France, and on the Rhine, the old Roman municipalities were emerging from their ashes; elsewhere, and particularly in central Germany, they were new creations. In all cases, they were ringed by protective walls and moats, fortresses far stronger than the castles of the nobility because they could be taken only by large armies. Behind these walls and moats, medieval craft production, guild-bound and petty though it was, developed; capital accumulation began; the need for trade with other cities and with the rest of the world arose; and, gradually, with the need there also arose the means of protecting this trade.

As early as the fifteenth century, the townspeople played a

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more crucial role in society than the feudality. To be sure, it was still true that agriculture occupied the largest proportion of the population and thus remained the chief mode of production. Nevertheless, the few isolated free peasants, who had managed to hold out here and there against the rapaciousness of the nobles were adequate proof that it was the work of the peasants and not the sloth and oppression of the nobles which made the crops grow.

At the same time, the needs of the nobility itself had so increased and changed that even they could not do without the cities: after all, it was in the cities that the noble obtained his own special "tools"—armor and weapons. Domestic textiles, furniture and ornament, Italian silk, the laces of Brabant, furs from the North, the perfumes of Araby, fruits from the Levant, and spices from India: everything but soap he had to buy from the townspeople. A certain degree of international trade had already developed: the Italians sailed the Mediterranean and along the Atlantic Coast as far north as Flanders; in the face of increasing English and Dutch competition, the Hanseatic League continued to dominate the North Sea and the Baltic Sea; the connection between the trade centers of the South and those of the North was overland, on roads which passed through Germany. Thus while the nobility was becoming increasingly superfluous and more and more obstructive to progress, the townspeople were coming to form the class which embodied the further development of production and commerce, of education, and of social and political institutions.

Judged by today's standards, all these advances in production and exchange were of a very limited scope. Production remained confined within the pattern of guild craftsmanship, and thus itself retained feudal characteristics; trade continued to be restricted to European waters and did not venture farther than the coastal cities of the Levant where the products of the Far East were taken aboard. Yet, petty though industry and the businessman remained, they were adequate to overturn feudal society; and they at least remained in motion, while the nobility stagnated.

In this situation the urban citizenry had a mighty weapon against feudalism: *money*. There was scarcely room for money in the typical feudal economy in the early Middle Ages. The lord obtained everything he needed from his serfs, either in the form of services, or in the form of finished products. Flax and wool were spun, woven into cloth, and made into clothing by the serfs' women; the man tilled the fields, and the children tended the lord's cattle and gathered for him the fruits of the forest, bird-nests, firewood; in addition, the whole family had to deliver up grain, fruit, eggs, butter, cheese, poultry, calves, and who knows how much else. Each

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feudal domain was sufficient unto itself; even feudal military obligations were taken in kind; trade and exchange were absent and money was superfluous. Europe had declined to so low a level, had retrogressed so far, that money at this time served far less a social function than it did a political: it was used for the *payment of taxes*, and was acquired chiefly by *robbery*.

All that had changed by the fifteenth century. Money was again becoming a general medium of exchange, so that the amount of it in circulation was much greater than it had been. Even the noble needed it now, and since he had little or nothing to sell, since also banditry had ceased to be easy, he was faced with the necessity of calling on the urban money-lender. Long before the ramparts of the baronial castles were breached by the new artillery, they had already been undermined by money; in fact, gunpowder could be described as an executor of the judgment rendered by money. The citizenry of the towns used money as a carpenter uses his plane: as a tool to level political inequality. Wherever a personal relationship was replaced by a monetary relationship, a rendering of goods by a rendering of money, that was the place where a bourgeois pattern took the place of a feudal pattern. By and large, of course, the brutal system of "natural economy" remained in most cases. Nevertheless, there were already entire districts where, as in Holland, Belgium, and along the lower Rhine, the peasants paid money instead of goods and services to their overlords; where master and man had taken the first decisive steps in the direction of becoming landowner and tenant; and where, consequently, even in the countryside the political institutions of feudalism began to lose their social basis.

How deeply the foundations of the feudality had been weakened and its structure corroded by money around the end of the fifteenth century, is strikingly evident in the lust for gold which possessed Western Europe at this time. It was *gold* that the Portuguese sought on the African coast, in India and the whole Far East; *gold* was the magic word which lured the Spaniards over the ocean to America; *gold* was the first thing the whites asked for when they set foot on a newly discovered coast. But this compulsion to embark on distant adventures in search of gold, however feudal were the forms which it took at first, was nonetheless basically incompatible with feudalism, the foundation of which was agriculture and the conquests of which were directed at the acquisition of land. To this it must be added that shipping was definitely a *bourgeois* business, a fact which has stamped every modern navy with an anti-feudal character.

So it was that the feudality of all Western Europe was in full decline during the fifteenth century. Everywhere cities, with their anti-feudal interests, their own law, and their armed citizenry had

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wedged themselves into feudal territories; had, through money, in part established their social—and here and there even their political—ascendancy over the feudal lords. Even in the countryside, in those areas where agriculture was favored by special circumstances, the old feudal ties began to dissolve under the influence of money; only in newly opened territories (such as the German lands east of the Elbe) or in other remote regions away from the trade routes, did the domination of the nobility continue to flourish. Everywhere, however, there had been an increase in those elements in the population, rural as well as urban, which insistently demanded that the senseless and eternal fighting should stop, that there should be an end to the feuds among the lords which produced a perpetual state of domestic warfare even when a foreign enemy was at the gates, that the uninterrupted, wholly purposeless devastation which had lasted throughout the entire Middle Ages should cease. Though these elements were still too weak to impose their own will, they found a sturdy support at the very top of the feudal heap: the monarchy. And it is at this point that analysis of social relations leads to consideration of the relations within and among states; here is where we proceed from economics to politics.

The new nationalities had arisen gradually out of the confusion of peoples which characterized the early Middle Ages. This is a process, in which, as is well known, the conquered assimilated the conquerors in the once Roman provinces; the peasants and townspeople absorbed the Germanic masters. Modern nationalities are thus the creations of the oppressed classes. Menke's district map of central Lorraine* gives us a clear picture of the manner in which here a mixing, there a sorting out, took place. One need only follow the line which divides the German from the Roman place names in order to convince oneself that this line in Belgium and lower Lorraine very nearly coincides with the linguistic boundary between German and French as it existed as late as the last quarter of the 18th century. Here and there a small area could be found in which predominance of language was still a matter of dispute. But by and large the dispute had already been settled, and which area should remain German, which Roman, had been established. The Old Lower Frankish and Old High German forms of most place names on the map go to prove, however, that they belong to the 9th, or at the latest the 10th century, and that, therefore, the boundaries had already been drawn by the end of the Carolingian period. Now it is interesting that we find, on the Roman side, and especially in the vicinity of the linguistic border, bastard name forms, made up of

* Spruner-Menke, *Handatlas zur Geschichte des Mittelalters und der neueren Zeit*, 3rd Ed., Gotha 1874, map no. 32.

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a German personal name and a Roman place name; thus, for example, west of the Maas, near Verdun: Eppone curtis, Rotfridi curtis, Ingolini curtis, Teudegisilo villa. Today these are, respectively, Ippécourt, Récourt la Creux, Amblaincourt sur Aire, and Thierville. These were Frankish manors, small German colonies in Roman territory, which sooner or later succumbed to Romanization. In the cities, and in individual rural stretches, there were more resistant German colonies which retained their language for a longer time; in one of these, for example, the Ludwigslied originated at the end of the 9th century. But the fact that Romance appeared as the official language of France on the oath-formulas of the kings and notables in 842 proves that a larger part of the Frankish masters had by that time been Romanized.

Once the language groups had been fixed and their boundaries established (though account must be taken of later wars of conquest and extermination, such as those against the Slavs of the Elbe), it was natural that they should serve as established foundations for the building of states, that the nationalities should begin to develop towards nations. The rapid collapse of the linguistically-mixed state of Lorraine suggests the importance of language uniformity. To be sure, linguistic boundaries and national boundaries were far from coinciding with one another during the entire Middle Ages; nevertheless, every nationality, the Italian to some extent excepted, was represented by a particular large state; and the tendency towards the formation of national states, which appeared with ever greater clarity and consciousness, provided one of the most fundamental of the levers by which progress was attained in the Middle Ages.

In each of these medieval states, the king was the apex of the entire feudal hierarchy—an apex which the vassals could not dispense with, and against which, at the same time, they found themselves in a state of permanent rebellion. The characteristic relationship of the whole feudal economy—the granting of rights to the use of land on condition that certain personal services and certain goods be rendered—provided in its original and simplest form plenty of occasion for quarrels, especially where there were so many who had an interest in any dispute. How was it now in the later Middle Ages, at a time when the feudal relations in every land were a hopeless snarl of granted, withdrawn, renewed, forfeited, changed, or otherwise qualified rights and duties? Charles the Bold, for example, was a vassal of the Holy Roman Emperor for part of his lands; in other parts, he was a vassal of the King of France. On the other hand, the King of France, Charles' lord in regard to these territories, was the vassal of Charles in regard to others. How could conflict be avoided in a situation like that? Here we see the explanation of

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the centuries-long counterpoint between the attraction of the vassals to the monarchy (for only the monarch could protect them from enemies outside and inside the system) and the repulsion away from the monarchy into which that attraction ceaselessly and inevitably shifted; of the uninterrupted battle between the monarch and the vassals, the ugly cacophony of which drowned out all others during the long period when banditry was the only source of income worthy of a free man; of the endless sequence of betrayal, assassination, poisonings, malice, and every other conceivable villainy, a sequence which, stopped for a moment, would always renew itself, hiding behind the poetic label of Chivalry and speaking in terms of Honor and Fidelity.

It is obvious that the monarchy was the progressive element in this general confusion. It represented order in chaos, the developing nation as against fragmentation into rebellious vassal-states. All the revolutionary elements which were coming into being under the feudal surface were as inclined to dependence on the monarchy as the monarchy was inclined to dependence on them. The alliance between monarchy and bourgeoisie dates from the tenth century; often disrupted by conflicts—for during the Middle Ages no movement was free of zigs and zags—the alliance was always renewed, stronger and more potent, until it enabled the monarchy to attain final victory; whereupon, the monarchy, in gratitude, turned on its allies to oppress and plunder them.

King and bourgeoisie found powerful support in the rising profession of jurist. With the rediscovery of Roman Law there came into being a division of labor between the clergy, the legal counsellors of feudal times, and the non-clerical students of jurisprudence. These new jurists were from the beginning predominantly bourgeois. But not only that: the law which they studied, lectured on, and practiced had an essentially anti-feudal and in certain respects bourgeois character. Roman Law is to so great an extent the classic juridical expression of the living conditions and frictions of a society in which the dominating concept is one of pure private property, that all later legislation could add but little to it in this respect. Bourgeois property in the Middle Ages was, however, still permeated with feudal limitations; it consisted, for example, largely of privileges. Thus Roman Law was in this regard an advance on the bourgeois relationships of the time. Yet the further historical development of bourgeois property could only be in the direction of pure private property, and this indeed is what happened. The lever of the Roman Law, which contained ready made everything to which the bourgeoisie of the later Middle Ages was still unconsciously striving, clearly added enormously to the strength and pace of this development.

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Even though the Roman Law offered a pretext in many individual cases for the increased oppression of the peasants by the nobility—for example, wherever the peasants were unable to furnish documentary proof of their freedom from obligations which were otherwise customary—this does not change the principle at issue. The nobility would have found adequate pretexts without the Roman Law, and did find them, daily. Beyond question, it was a mighty advance when a system of law was established which did not rest on feudal relations and which fully anticipated modern ideas of private property.

We have seen how the feudal nobility began to become superfluous and even economically detrimental in the society of the late Middle Ages; how it already stood politically in the way of the development of the cities and of the national state, for which a monarchical form was the only possibility at the time. Despite these facts, the nobility had been preserved by the circumstance that hitherto it had had a monopoly on the bearing of arms, by the fact that without the noble no war could be waged, no battle fought. Even this was to change, and the last step was to be taken which would make abundantly clear to the feudal lord that his period of social and political domination was at an end, and that even in his capacity as knight, even on the battlefield, he was no longer useful.

To fight feudalism with an army which was itself feudal, the members of which were more closely bound to their immediate lord than the royal army command, would have been to move in a vicious circle. From the beginning of the 14th century, the kings strive constantly to emancipate themselves from feudal armies, to create their own armies. It is from this period that we find an ever increasing proportion of recruited or hired troops in the royal armies. In the beginning, they were mostly infantry, the dregs of the city, fugitive serfs—Lombards, Genoese, Germans, Belgians, and the like—used for the occupation of towns and the siege of fortresses, since at first they were scarcely serviceable on the field of battle itself. Nevertheless, before the end of the Middle Ages we also find the knights, who are already contracting themselves and their god-knows-how-recruited followers into the mercenary service of foreign princes, and in so doing announcing the hopeless doom of the feudal military system.

Simultaneously there arose the basic prerequisite of a militarily competent infantry in the cities and among the free peasants, where the latter had persisted or had once again emerged. Prior to this, the knights and their mounted followers had formed not so much the nucleus of the army as the army itself; the gang of accompanying serfs, the "footmen" hardly counted: it seemed—on the battlefield—

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to be present merely for flight and plunder. As long as feudalism flourished, until the end of the 13th century, the cavalry fought and decided every battle. From then on, however, the situation changed; and it changed in many aspects simultaneously. In England, the gradual disappearance of serfdom gave rise to a numerous class of free peasants, yeomen or tenants, and therewith to the new material for a new infantry, practiced in the use of the long-bow which was, at the time, the English national weapon. The introduction of these archers, who always fought on foot though they might or might not be mounted on the march, was the occasion for an essential change in the tactics of the English armies. From the 14th century on, the English knighthood preferred to fight on foot whenever the terrain or other circumstances made it appropriate. Behind the archers, who started the battle and softened up the enemy, the dismounted knights awaited the enemy attack in a closed phalanx, or waited for a favorable opportunity to break out with an attack themselves. Only part of the knights remained on their horses in order to help in the decision by flank attacks. The unbroken succession of English victories in France at this time is to be attributed primarily to this reintroduction of a defensive element into the army; for the most part, they were as much defensive battles followed by offensive counter-attacks as were the victories of Wellington in Spain and Belgium. With the adoption of the new tactic by the French—which was possible because mercenary Italian crossbowmen could be used as the counterpart of the English archers—the victorious surge of the English was brought to a halt. It was likewise at the beginning of the 14th century that the infantry of the Flemish cities had dared to oppose the French knighthood in open battle—and they were often successful. The emperor Albert, in his attempt to betray the Swiss peasants into subjection to the Archduke of Austria, who happened to be Albert himself, gave the stimulus to the formation of the first modern infantry of European repute. In the triumphs of the Swiss over the Austrians and, in particular, over the Burgundians, lay the final succumbing of armor, mounted or not, to infantry; of the feudal army to the beginnings of the modern army; of the knight to the townsman and peasant. And the Swiss immediately went on to turn their martial prowess into hard cash, thereby establishing from the word go the bourgeois character of their republic, the first independent republic in Europe. All political considerations disappeared; the cantons converted themselves into recruiting offices in order to corral mercenaries to offer to the highest bidder. Elsewhere, too, and particularly in Germany, the recruiting drum went around. But the cynicism of the Swiss regime, whose sole purpose appeared to be the sale of its sons, went unequalled

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until the German princes, in the period of deepest national abasement, surpassed it.

It was also in the 14th century that gunpowder and artillery were brought into Europe from the Arabs, by way of Spain. Until the end of the Middle Ages, small firearms remained unimportant, which is understandable in view of the fact that the longbows of the English archers at Crécy reached as far, and with perhaps as much accuracy if not with the same effect, as the smooth-bore muskets of the infantry at Waterloo. Field artillery was likewise still in its infancy. In contrast to this, however, the heavy cannon had already breached the unsupported walls of many a knight's castle, thus announcing to the feudal nobility that the advent of gunpowder had sealed its doom.

The spread of the printer's art, the renaissance of the study of the ancient literatures, the whole cultural ferment which became constantly stronger and more general after 1450—all these things favored the bourgeoisie and monarchy in their conflict with feudalism. The concatenation of all these factors, strengthened from year to year by their increasingly dynamic interaction on one another in the same direction, was the fact which, in the last half of the 15th century, confirmed the victory, not, to be sure, of the bourgeoisie, but certainly of the monarchy, over feudalism. Everywhere in Europe, right into those more remote areas which bordered on it and had not passed through the feudal stage, the royal power suddenly got the upper hand. Behind the Pyrenees, two of the Romance language groups of the area united to form the Kingdom of Spain and subjugated the Provençal-speaking nation of Aragon to the Castilian written language. The third group consolidated its language area, with the exception of Galicia, into the Kingdom of Portugal, the Iberian Holland; turned its face seaward; and proved its right to a separate existence by its maritime activity. In France, Louis XI finally—after the downfall of the Burgundian buffer state—created a monarchical national unity in the still very limited French territory to such good effect that his successor was already able to meddle in Italian squabbles. The fact is that its existence was threatened only once—by the Reformation—in later years. England had finally given up its quixotic wars of conquest in France: in the long run, it would have bled itself white in these wars. The English feudal nobility sought substitute recreation in the Wars of the Roses. It got more than it bargained for: tearing itself to pieces in these wars, it brought the House of Tudor to the throne, and the royal power of the House of Tudor surpassed everything that had gone before or was to come after. The Scandinavian countries had long since been unified. After its union with Lithuania, Poland was on

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the way to its period of greatest glory, with a kingly power as yet undiminished. Even in Russia, the overthrow of the princes and the throwing off of the Tatar yoke went hand in hand and were completed by Ivan III. In all of Europe, there were only two countries in which the Monarchy, and the national unity which at that time was impossible without it, had not arisen, or existed only on paper: Italy and Germany.

INTERNATIONAL ANTHEM

Join hands, ye nations,
this is the last call:
join hands, or the Play ends,
and the curtains fall.

Gun and bomb and sword
have had their day:
now for the living Word
and the King's way.

Let Peace be the bridegroom;
if he is denied
Death will take his place,
and Earth will be the bride.

It is yours to say.
This is the last call:
join hands, or the Play ends,
and the curtains fall.

—Wilson MacDonald

WORLD EVENTS

By Scott Nearing

Moving In On the Middle East

After the brief and decisive struggle for Suez, the vortex of the power struggle has shifted to the Middle East. Suez is a channel of trade and communication. The Middle East, in addition to a large proportion of the planet's oil reserves, offers a considerable market for manufactured goods. The elimination of Britain and France as serious contenders for the control of Western Asia leaves the Soviet Union (which adjoins Western Asia) and the United States (which is separated from the area by some five or six thousand miles) as the Big Two rivals. The several native populations which occupy Western Asia, as well as India and China, have a deep interest in the power struggle for the area.

President Eisenhower opened the campaign for Middle East control by telling a joint session of Congress that Washington should finance and arm those Western Asian nations which requested such assistance. (See the February *MR*, pp. 378-379; also the opening section of *World Events* in the March issue.) Secretary of State Dulles supported his chief by assuring the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives on January 7, 1957, that "it would be a major disaster for the nations and peoples of the Middle East, and indeed for all the world, if that area were to fall into the grip of international Communism."

The Soviet Union Charges Aggression

Soviet Foreign Minister Shepilov made the next move. In a speech before the Supreme Soviet on February 13, in notes handed to the Western Powers on February 12, and in a resolution presented to the Steering Committee of the United Nations Assembly, Soviet spokesmen accused the United States of aggression. The accusation was based upon these citations:

- (1) The United States has outlined a program for Western Asia which involves new military provocations, and is a continuation of the policy of aggressive military pacts and blocs, such as NATO, SEATO, and the Baghdad Pact.

- (2) The United States has committed aggression on a global

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scale by setting up military bases in Western Europe, Turkey, Iran, and Japan, provided with the facilities for launching atomic weapons.

(3) United States bases in France, Britain, West Germany, Turkey, and Iran constitute a menace to peace.

(4) The United States budget, presented in January, 1957, proposes unprecedented sums for war preparations, including new bases in Brazil, a jet base in Pakistan, and air force bases in Taiwan and West Germany.

As an alternative to the Eisenhower Doctrine for Western Asia, the Soviet Union proposed: (1) settling disputes in the area exclusively by negotiation and other non-military means; (2) non-interference in the internal affairs of Mid-Eastern nations and respect for their independence; (3) renunciation of any effort to include these countries in military blocs organized by the Great Powers; (4) liquidation of foreign bases and withdrawal of foreign troops from the Middle East; (5) mutual renunciation of further supplies of arms to the area; (6) cooperation of the chief powers in the economic development of Western Asia without making economic, military, or other conditions incompatible with the dignity and sovereignty of these countries.

Lodge's Retort Discourteous

Replying to the Soviet resolution naming the United States an aggressor, Ambassador Lodge declared that the charges were "blatantly and stupidly false from one end to the other." He added, "It is a gigantic cock-and-bull story." How, he asked, can the Washington government be charged with an aggressive intention to promote a war when the people of the United States hate war? Besides, Mr. Lodge added, under the United States system there can be no aggression.

Put to a vote in the Steering Committee on February 14, the Soviet resolution accusing the United States of aggression and calling for a debate on the subject in the General Assembly was defeated by a vote of 8 to 6, with one abstention.

Irrespective of the Steering Committee's decision, we would like to pursue the discussion, because we consider it one of the most vital issues now confronting mankind. Unavoidably we must begin the analysis by asking: What is aggression?

What Is Aggression?

Volumes have been devoted to definitions of aggression. We would like to add to this literature one sentence. "Any act which enables one sovereign state to limit the sovereignty of another

sovereign state constitutes an aggression." With that definition as a basis, we wish to examine the issue which spokesmen for the Soviet Union and the United States debated in the Steering Committee.

For the sake of brevity and clarity, let us confine the argument to United States military bases and installations set up on the territory of other nations. During the debate in the Steering Committee, spokesmen for Turkey and Pakistan insisted that no United States base existed in their respective countries. This is a question of fact and of law which we cannot settle here. It is a matter of record that the United States has military bases in foreign countries. The existence of such bases involves the stationing of United States military personnel on foreign soil. Let us take Japan as an example.

More than 100,000 United States military personnel are now quartered in Japan. In order to effectivize this occupation, the United States command has called upon the Japanese government to expropriate land for airfields and other needs of the occupying forces. The Japanese government, under its agreement with the United States, took over the land from its occupiers and cultivators. Expropriation, directed by one nation against the territory of another, is aggression. Legalization by Tokyo does not alter the fact. The power to decide policy involving land and people in Japan passes from Tokyo to Washington when an agreement permits Washington to occupy Japanese territory.

Japan may be a special case, because of its recent military defeat by the United States. Precisely the same situation exists and the same argument applies to United States bases in England.

Presumably the mere fact of occupation of a sovereign state by the armed forces of another state is aggression. Certainly it is treated as such by the populace of the occupied country.

According to the Defense Department, Washington has a million men in uniform stationed abroad in several hundred installations, each one having at least five United States military personnel. Each such installation is a nucleus of potential or actual aggression.

"There Can Be No Aggression"

"Under the United States system, there can be no aggression," Mr. Lodge told the United Nations Steering Committee. We wonder where the Ambassador studied history.

Between 1790 and 1890, the United States took part in 110 Indian wars. These wars were, of course "purely defensive," but their net result was to drive the American Indian occupiers of the territory off from the good lands onto the bad lands, leaving the good lands for the conquering whites.

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Between 1846 and 1848, the Washington government invaded the territory of Mexico and destroyed its armies in a series of battles. At war's end Washington took from Mexico a large part of what is now Texas, Arizona, New Mexico, and California.

War, forced on Spain in 1898, netted the Washington government Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines.

During the war years 1916-1919, the armed forces of the United States invaded Mexico, Western Europe, and Russia.

United States armed forces invaded Korea in 1950. They still occupy South Korea.

From 1940 to 1957, the ruling oligarchy of the United States has done its best to usher in The American Century. Superiority in industrial production has led to superiority in wealth and income, in mechanized armament, and in military striking power, with a vast capacity in plane production, a navy equal to all the other navies of the world combined, and an annual arms expenditure greater than that of any other nation.

After crumpling up UNRRA, the Washington government inaugurated a unilateral relief program which has converted some fifty nations into economic dependents of the United States Treasury. Need for continuation of the relief has forced many of these countries to accept United States military personnel, equipment, and capital installations such as air and naval bases. The long-drawn-out bargaining with the Franco government over the occupation of Spanish territory by United States armed forces is a case in point.

In the opening weeks of 1957, Washington is in a position to exercise effective military control in the North Atlantic and the North Pacific. The United States Sixth Fleet patrols and controls the Mediterranean Sea. Bases in North Africa, Southern Europe, and the Near East give Washington superficial military domination over the Mediterranean approaches. Implemented with economic grants, military equipment and personnel, the Eisenhower Doctrine may yield Washington a similar domination over the vital resources of Western Asia.

Beginning in 1789 as a narrow, sparsely populated strip of territory lying along the Atlantic seacoast, the United States has expanded and aggressed for two centuries—first across North America under the slogan of American Destiny, and latterly across the Northern Hemisphere, under the slogan of peace, freedom, and anti-Communism.

Ambassador Lodge asserts that there can be no aggression under the United States system. History answers that during the last two centuries, the United States system has netted Washington sovereignty

over a great section of continental North America and superficial control of the sea and air approaches to most of the Northern Hemisphere, outside those areas occupied by the Soviet Union, the Chinese Peoples Republic, and their allies. When has an equal land area been brought under the domination of one nation in an equally brief period of time? Mr. Lodge may be in order when he falsifies history on the floor of the United Nations, but he is certainly out of order when he insists that there can be no aggression under the United States system. As a matter of historical fact, in terms of territory acquired, and economic and political policy dictated, the United States is the most successful aggressor of the past two centuries. This expansion and aggression have been carried on by negotiation and cash payment where possible, by force of arms where necessary. President Eisenhower has repeatedly justified this procedure in six words: "Our economy must continue to expand."

Plain Speaking in Asia

At the end of a five day visit to Ceylon, China's Foreign Minister, Mr. Chou En-lai, and the Ceylonese Prime Minister, Mr. Solomon Bandaranaike, canvassed the world situation and formulated their conclusions in a joint statement on February 5, 1957. After declaring adherence to the decisions of the 1955 Bandung Conference, urging the importance of putting the decisions into action, and disapproving of military blocs, the statement continued: "At this time it is necessary to strengthen the solidarity of Asian-African nations to oppose in this area the aggression and expansion of the imperialist and colonial forces that are still trying desperately to thwart the freedom and progress which the peoples of the world are striving to achieve. . . . The continuance of power politics, or the substitution of one power for some other in the name of filling up a so-called vacuum, will not help to solve the problems of this area, whose people must be free to work out their own destiny in accordance with their own wishes."

At the same time, Mr. Chou spoke his mind to a crowded press conference in Colombo, Ceylon. The Western powers, he said in reply to a barrage of questions on the Kashmir problem, are "trying to exploit the dispute between India and Pakistan."

After a reporter had quoted from a statement by President Eisenhower, Mr. Chou answered sharply: "Why should we always listen to the words of the President of the United States? The United States does not recognize China. The United States still obstructs the restoration of China's rightful place in the United Nations. The United States still carries on its policy of embargo against China. . . . We have all suffered. We have suffered from colonialism. Why

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should we always pay attention to the words of the Western countries, especially the United States?"

"The peoples of Asian countries," Mr. Chou En-lai continued, "want to engage in peaceful reconstruction. They need finances and they need help from other countries. But help must be genuine, without strings attached, and must be on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. Such help would be welcomed by all the peoples, including the Chinese people."

It is not surprising that Chou and Bandaranaike should express themselves forcefully regarding imperialism, colonialism, Western divide-and-rule policies, and the need for Asian-African unity. The significant aspect of the statement and interview was their general display, under two or three column headlines, on the front pages of the more important papers of Asia.

Some Reasons for Hating China

Speaking to a Washington press conference on February 19, the Secretary of State indicted China on seven counts. The Chinese (1) had fought the United Nations and the United States in Korea; (2) had prevented a political settlement there; (3) had seized Tibet; (4) had fomented war in Indo-China; (5) threatened aggression by force against Taiwan; (6) held United States prisoners in "vilest prison conditions"; and (7) conducted a violent campaign against the United States wherever possible.

The Secretary accuses the Chinese Peoples Republic of being a sovereign nation pursuing its own interests while ignoring those of its neighbors. Does the United States do otherwise?

Gravy for the Gander

Washington insists that Peking renounce military force as a means of readjusting the power balance in and near Taiwan (Formosa). Taiwan lies within a hundred miles of the China coast and is historically Chinese.

President Eisenhower is asking Congress for authority to use military force as a means of readjusting the power balance in the Middle East. The Middle East is five or six thousand miles from North America. Historically, the United States has had no foothold there and presumably is poking its fingers into a plum cake that was a British-French protectorate until these disintegrating empires lost their grip on the area.

We would be interested to hear the Secretary of State apply his Golden Rule Doctrine to this seeming contradiction. Perhaps the formula should read: "What is sauce for the goose is gravy for the gander."



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(continued from inside front cover)

Friday, April 26, and in Chicago under the auspices of the Associates and The Eugene V. Debs Forum on Thursday, May 2 (the Music Room, Fine Arts Building, 410 South Michigan Avenue). We are working on three other meetings— Berkeley, April 28, and San Francisco, April 29; and Detroit at the Labor Forum, May 3. Subscribers in the Bay and Detroit areas will be notified when the arrangements for these meetings have been settled.

On March 5th, the Sweezy case was argued before the United States Supreme Court, and we look forward to a decision some time before the Court's present session ends in June. Your editor made the trip to Washington to observe the proceedings and never spent a more intensely interesting two hours in his life. Professor Thomas Emerson of the Yale Law School argued the appeal from the adverse decision of the New Hampshire Supreme Court, and New Hampshire Attorney General Louis C. Wyman represented the state's case. Emerson's three chief arguments were: (1) that the questions put to Sweezy in the New Hampshire investigation of "subversive activities" related to lawful activities and were clearly violative of free speech and association; (2) that the concept of "subversive" as understood by the New Hampshire authorities and interpreted by the state Supreme Court is so vague as to deprive a witness of the right to due process; and (3) that under the doctrine of the Pennsylvania Nelson case the states are prohibited from investigating as well as prosecuting in the whole field of subversion. Wyman, clearly aware that the fate of all state investigations was hanging in the balance, attempted to persuade the Court that the New Hampshire investigation had only been trying to get at facts which might be the basis of legislation (like the New York Feinberg Law) of a kind that the Supreme Court itself had already ruled constitutional. All the justices except Clark and Burton participated in questioning the two lawyers, and to the untrained ears of your editor it sounded as though they had a definite bias in favor of free speech. He has, however, been duly warned by more experienced observers against drawing any conclusions from the kind of questions that are put in oral argument.

The response to our request to readers to help us fill orders for *The ABC of Socialism*, by Leo Huberman and Sybil May, *We, the People*, by Leo Huberman, and the September and October issues of MR, has been gratifying. Remember that we will exchange any three of our other pamphlets for *The ABC*, and any one of the following books for *We, the People*: *Man's Worldly Goods*, by Leo Huberman; *The Bending Cross*, by Ray Ginger; *The Treason of the Senate*, by David Graham Phillips; or *Out of Your Pocket*, by Darel McConkey.

We would also like to get hold of a number of copies of Paul Sweezy's *Socialism*, and will be glad to send you in exchange any one of the Goldberg, Baran, or Adler books.

We have been asked to announce that early in April the volume *The Rosenbergs: Poems of the United States*, edited by Martha Millet, will be published at a price of \$3 by Sierra Press, P. O. Box 96, Long Island City 4, New York. The volume contains poems by George Abbe, W. E. B. DuBois, Michael Gold, Alfred Kreymborg, Walter Lowenfels, Eve Merriam, Yuri Suhl and others, and features a prose sketch entitled "My Husband Morty" by Helen Sobell.

To the third-anniversary celebration for *The American Socialist* which was held on March 16th at the home of Harvey and Jessie O'Connor in Winnetka, Illinois, we sent the following message: "Fraternal greetings from *Monthly Review* to *The American Socialist* on its third anniversary. May it live to see the day when we will all be socialist Americans!"

Monthly Review Press is proud to announce that
on April 18 it will officially publish

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GROWTH

by

Paul A. Baran

Professor of Economics, Stanford University



To celebrate the occasion, MR Associates has arranged a meeting to be held on the evening of April 18 at 8:30 at the Hotel Claridge, Broadway and 44th St., at which Professor Baran will speak on

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Admission to Associates free, to others \$1.00 in advance or \$1.50 at the door.

You will be able to buy an autographed copy of THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GROWTH at the prepublication price of \$3 at the meeting, or \$6 with a one-year subscription. Thereafter the prices go up to \$5 and \$7 respectively.

